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2A brief background
Why is the European Commission overseeing the 
radioactivity monitoring of the EU Member States?
According to Chapter 3 of the Euratom Treaty (i.e. Articles 30-39), the EU Member 
States are responsible for the implementation of basic standards laid down within 
the Community for the protection of the health of workers and the general public 
against the dangers arising from ionising radiations. Articles 35 and 36 oblige 
the Member States to monitor the level of radioactivity in the air, water and soil 
and to report to the European Commission. The Euratom Treaty also obliges the 
Commission to verify the operation and efficiency of this monitoring. The purposes 
of the monitoring are the following.
 Ensuring the health and safety of citizens (ensuring basic safety standards).
  Providing accurate monitoring results to the national radioprotection agencies 
and the Commission so they have the necessary data to enable them to trigger 
or recommend additional health and safety measures due to an incidental or 
intentional release of radioactivity in the environment, for example a nuclear 
accident or a malicious act.
Today, much of the data is also made publicly available by the Commission’s Joint 
Research Centre (JRC). This brings added value as the international scientific community 
can find information for itself, which can, for example, be used to prove the validity of 
environmental dispersion models.
What are the tasks of the JRC?
The JRC supports the Commission’s Directorate-General for Energy with technical 
and scientific input into its work. The JRC does so by verifying the Member States’ 
implementation of Chapter 3 of the Euratom Treaty in numerous ways. Note that 
this report deals (solely) with the specific task of assessing the quality of 
the radiological monitoring results that the Member States report to the 
Commission.
3Who is doing this job?
A multinational expert team at the JRC, most of them with a master’s degree or a PhD.
Where and when does it take place?
At JRC-Geel in northern Belgium, where the quality of the data from the Member 
States’ monitoring programmes has been continuously assessed since 2003.
What are proficiency tests and how are they used?
To verify the procedures and methods of the monitoring labs of the Member States, 10 
proficiency tests (PTs) were conducted by the JRC. These took place between 2003 and 
2018, and were based on sample materials such as air filters, water, crops and soil. 
First the JRC produces a reference material that contains a well-established quantity 
of radioactivity. It then distributes samples to the Member States’ labs. Finally the JRC 
collects the data, compares the results and gives feedback and recommendations.
This document describes all 10 PTs — why and how they were designed, and how they 
have been used to ensure the quality of the monitoring of environmental radioactivity 
in the Member States of the EU. The text also provides proposals for improvements in 
best practices and international standards.
The PTs also serve as a means for certain institutes to show their traceability to the 
International System of Units (SI). This was possible because the JRC was a signatory 
of the mutual recognition agreement on specific calibration and measurement 
capabilities, registered in the database of the International Bureau of Weights and 
Measures (BIPM) in Paris.
Please note: In this report some aspects and results have been presented in an 
abbreviated and simplified manner. For detailed scientific-technical reports see 
https://remon.jrc.ec.europa.eu/Services/Proficiency-Tests
4GENERAL
  The general status of radioactivity monitoring in the EU is good. 
The Chernobyl disaster of 1986 served as an alarm bell, demonstrating 
that radioactivity monitoring in Europe could be vastly improved, as 
could international cooperation in these matters. Ever since, ambitions, 
methodologies, instrumentation and international cooperation have been 
continually upgraded.
  New opportunities for research arise as monitoring networks grow and 
instrumentation improves. 
As lower levels of radioactivity can be detected across a greater network 
of laboratories, the tracing of radioactivity back to (undisclosed) sources is 
enabled — even if the release is very small. This not only makes it possible 
to better assess the impact of any radioactive release, it also provides the 
scientific community with valuable data that is useful, for example, in studying 
wind patterns, sea currents, ecological processes and the impact of industries.
 Better sharing and exchanging of best practices. 
Differences in practices exist between laboratories and countries. This can 
create comparability problems and can be a source of dispute. However, in 
certain cases it is also an asset that different approaches are available to 
reach the same result. Moreover, the multitude of radionuclides and the great 
variety of matrices being monitored offer very different technical challenges, 
which are difficult for a single laboratory to master. Therefore, the better 
sharing and exchanging of experience and best practices remains an overall 
objective.
PROFICIENCY TESTS
  PTs have become important tools to study the capacity of the European 
monitoring labs for generating good-quality data. 
This is not only important for the EU as a whole, but also for the Member 
States (especially non-nuclear Member States). They are now served with an 
independent evaluation of the status of their national monitoring and receive 
top-quality reference materials to help validate their own methods.
Observations and conclusions
5  PTs serve as a complement to verification visits.
A PT will assess every Member State almost every year. This is a convenient and 
effective complement to the verification visits that the Commission carries out. 
During such visits only about four Member States (and one or two installations) 
per year can be assessed.
The reference materials that are provided in connection to the PTs at hand 
have been shown to be very useful to Member States’ laboratories. This is 
particularly true in the case of short-lived radionuclides for which no certified 
reference materials exist (e.g. iodine-131, with a half-life of 8 days; radon-222, 
with a half-life of 3.8 days).
TRAINING AND EDUCATION
  Skills, competences and workforce availability.
The importance of retaining critical competences in nuclear science was already 
being acknowledged by the nuclear community in the 1990s. In recent years a 
number of studies have been undertaken to examine the concern that nuclear 
education and training are in decline. The capacity of a laboratory to provide 
accurate measurements is closely related to the skill and experience of the 
staff. We have also made this observation on the basis of follow-up workshops, 
training sessions and responses received to questionnaires. Accordingly, 
teaching, education and vocational training are now more of a priority than ever.
MONITORING TECHNIQUES
  Gross counting techniques give very poor results in the PTs. 
Such counting techniques have proved to be unreliable for environmental 
monitoring. They should be used with caution and only in special cases where 
relatively good control of the different radionuclides present in the sample is 
available.
  The collection and handling of samples introduces special challenges. 
Sampling — including collection, transport, storage and sample preparation — 
is an art. Increased efforts and research are necessary to better understand 
and quantify the errors introduced through environmental sampling. This is 
particularly true for volatile elements (such as iodine) or inert gases (such as 
radon).
6  There must be routines to avoid serious errors. 
One mistake that is rare but that has dire consequences is to report an incorrect 
value that deviates from the correct one by a factor of 1 000 or even 1 000 000. 
This means, for example, writing ‘kg’ instead of ‘g’ or ‘Bq’ instead of ‘mBq’, or 
using a decimal comma instead of a decimal point. Such errors are easy to 
make, and there must be a process in place by means of which every reported 
value is double- or triple-checked before reporting.
  International collaboration is an asset. 
Radiation does not stop at borders. Any severe accident or contamination 
incident that affects a number of countries inside or outside of the EU will 
require contacts and the sharing of knowledge. It is therefore positive to see 
that networking and partnering activities between Member States and their 
neighbours has improved. There are examples of networking activities at 
international level. For example, the International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA) is organising a network called Almera (Analytical Laboratories for the 
Measurement of Environmental Radioactivity). It has a goal similar to the work 
described in this report, namely to ensure the quality of monitoring data. The 
Cellar network (Collaboration of European Low-level Underground Laboratories) 
initiated by the JRC and the Physikalisch-Technische Bundesanstalt (German 
national metrology institute) promotes technological developments that serve 
to increase the robustness of monitoring data.
7About this quick guide
This guide gives a general introduction to how and why radioactivity monitoring is 
performed within the European Union. In non-jargon language, it explains what PTs are 
and how they are designed and managed by the JRC in Geel, Belgium.
In addition, the tutorial in the Annex gives some context to promote understanding 
and curiosity, for example on radiation biology, nuclear accidents and measurement 
techniques.
Note that there is also a list of initialisms at the end of the Annex.
The guide represents an abbreviated and simplified compilation of the official 
PT reports. (See the REMON website: https://remon.jrc.ec.europa.eu).
 

Brief description of 
10 proficiency tests 
between 2003 and 2018
The full reports on these PTs can be downloaded free of charge from: 
https://remon.jrc.ec.europa.eu/Services/Proficiency-Tests
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Overview
Ten proficiency tests have been organised by JRC-Geel since 2003
In this section the 10 PTs organised up to 2018 are presented, with information on why 
they were performed, which radionuclides were measured and what the outcome was.
In principle, every Member State was represented in each PT, but not always with the same 
laboratories. One important aspect of the added value of a PT to the Member States’ labs 
is that they receive a high-quality reference material and can use the PT as an important 
quality-control tool and for obtaining accreditation. This is particularly important for non-
nuclear (or smaller) Member States that are generally less well equipped compared to the 
two major nuclear Member States (France and the United Kingdom), which also organise 
their own PT schemes.
Table 1. Summary of the 10 PTs that have been conducted by the JRC since 2003.
Year Sample type Radionuclides Reporting labs
Reported 
results (*)
2003 Air filter 137Cs 43 48
2005 Milk powder 40K, 90Sr, 137Cs 63 149
2008 Mineral water  226Ra, 228Ra, 234U, 238U 45 152
2010 Soil Fifteen different radionuclides 73 743
2011 Dried bilberries 40K, 90Sr, 137Cs 88 222
2012 Mineral water Gross alpha, gross beta 71 404
2014 Air filter 137Cs 78 76
2016 Air filter 134Cs, 137Cs, 131I 67 201
2017 Dried maize 134Cs, 137Cs, 131I (40K) 120 120
2018 Drinking water
222Rn 101 135
(*)  Generally the activity of one radionuclide counts as one result. Not all labs are equipped to measure 
all radionuclides. In some cases it was agreed that labs could report separate results for a radionuclide 
using different techniques.
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It is the Article 35 and 36 experts from the Member States who suggest to the 
Commission at their regular meetings which radionuclides and matrices to select for 
upcoming PTs. This is triggered by issues such as new legislation, developments in 
instrumentation and the publication of new international standards.
Figure 1. A timeline showing the context of the PTs. It is often EU legislation that 
drives the need to select certain radionuclides and matrices in the PTs.
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Proficiency test I
Air filter (2003)
Highlighting a diversity of lab practices
Why was it performed?
Caesium-137 is a key radionuclide when monitoring radioactive contamination after a 
nuclear accident, in both the short-term (days) and the long-term (many years, even 
decades) perspective. Air monitoring is a vital monitoring task, as it has the potential to 
detect contamination before it enters urban and ecological systems in the immediate 
aftermath of an accident.
Radionuclides and measurement techniques
Caesium-137 (beta-decaying but also emitting gamma rays; half-life 30 years).
Measurement was based on the gamma rays emitted at 662 keV, detected with a 
high-purity germanium (HPGe) detector.
Key findings
With only a few exceptions, the communication, logistics and cooperation between the 
JRC and the 43 participating Member State labs worked as planned.
Out of 48 reported measurement results, 42 were within ± 33 % of the JRC-Geel 
reference value.
Taking both reported value and uncertainty into consideration, 12 labs got unacceptable 
results; they needed to investigate possible sources of error in their measurement process.
It was revealed that air-sampling procedures differ widely among the Member States, 
and that the area of the filters used varies by a factor of 2 000. Accordingly, the 
caesium-137 activity per measured filter varied from 0.03 Bq to 0.6 Bq. Among the 
43 participating laboratories, 37 different types of filters were used.
13
Figure 2. A modest value of ± 33 % was set in this PT, although caesium-137 in air filters 
should be relatively easy to measure. The reason for accepting up to 33 % relative deviation 
was that 37 different types of air filters were used by the participating laboratories.
Notes
Caesium-137 is expected to be discharged in large quantities after any major nuclear 
accident. Accordingly, airborne particles carrying this nuclide serve as an early-warning 
sign that something out of the ordinary has taken place.
HPGe detectors are the workhorses of routine monitoring laboratories in EU Member 
States; they are used for most gamma-ray-emitting radionuclides.
In general, filter samples are easy to measure since there is little attenuation of 
gamma radiation by the filter material. In addition, radiochemical pretreatment is 
seldom needed.
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The full report on this PT can be downloaded free of charge from: 
https://remon.jrc.ec.europa.eu/Services/Proficiency-Tests
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Proficiency test II
Milk powder (2005)
A food source with some analytical challenges
Why was it performed?
It is important to monitor cow’s milk for two reasons: it is an important component of 
human nutrition; and it is sensitive to airborne contamination as a large proportion of 
the forage for the cows grows in the open air.
A commercially available milk powder reference material with elevated levels of 
radioactivity was used (IAEA-152). The milk was from cows in Ukraine that have 
metabolised contaminated fodder from the Chernobyl area.
Radionuclides, radiation and measurement techniques
Caesium-137 (see PT I). With chemistry similar to potassium it has a short biological 
half-life of about 70 days.
Potassium-40 (naturally present beta emitter; half-life >1 billion years).
Strontium-90 (beta emitter; half-life 29 years). A ‘bone-seeking’ radionuclide with 
a complex metabolism in the human body and a very uncertain biological half-life 
between 18 years and 50 years.
Caesium-137 and potassium-40 were measured using gamma-ray spectrometry (GS), 
whereas strontium-90 was measured using gas flow proportional counting, liquid 
scintillation counting (LSC), Cherenkov counting, plastic scintillators or Geiger-Müller 
counters — all of them after a variety of radiochemical preparation, separation and 
extraction methods were applied.
Key findings
There was a distinct difference between measurements based on GS (caesium-137 
and potassium-40) and radiochemical methods (strontium-90), with the latter proving 
far more challenging.
The low response rate for strontium-90 was probably a consequence of the time-
consuming nature of radiochemistry combined with one out of the variety of 
measurement methods.
Fifty-nine laboratories participated. All reported results for caesium-137 and 
potassium-40, but only 45 reported results for strontium-90.
15
Figure 3. Strontium-90 requires radiochemistry work to precede the measurements 
and consequently not all labs could report. The reported results were quite good with 
a group of labs tending to overestimate.
Notes
The reference material was obtained in the form of hard lumps that were reprocessed 
at JRC-Geel’s laboratory for reference materials to form free-flowing powder.
Many laboratories normally monitor milk in its liquid form, and some also perform 
the measurements on liquid samples. In these cases the inability to reconstitute a 
homogeneous liquid from the milk powder may have been a possible source of error 
during analysis.
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The full report on this PT can be downloaded free of charge from: 
https://remon.jrc.ec.europa.eu/Services/Proficiency-Tests
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Proficiency test III
Mineral water (2008)
Significant deviations between Member States’ labs
Why was it performed?
This test was organised in anticipation of new EU requirements (in the form of a Council 
directive) for monitoring radioactivity in drinking water. The radionuclides below were 
measured in three different commercial brands of mineral water.
Radionuclides, radiation and measurement techniques
Radium-226 (alpha emitter; half-life 1 600 years); radium-228 (beta emitter; half-life 
5.8 years); uranium-234 (alpha emitter; half-life 245 500 years); uranium-238 (alpha 
emitter; half-life 4.5 billion years).
The alpha emitters were measured using alpha-particle spectrometry (AS) (preceded 
by radiochemical separation). Radium-228 was measured using GS but also using 
LSC and proportional counters. The two latter techniques required a radiochemical 
separation prior to the measurement.
Key findings
This PT gave many unsatisfactory results. It was noted that several different methods 
were used by the participants.
Regarding radium, the number of discrepant measurements was alarmingly high: 
among the labs, about 25 % with regard to radium-226 and more than 40 % with 
regard to radium-228 did not pass the evaluation criteria. In 14 % of cases the results 
were off by more than a factor of 2.
Regarding uranium, the results were somewhat better than for radium: 6 % were off 
by a factor of 2 or more.
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Figure 4. For radium-226, most Member States’ labs produced an acceptable 
value, but a majority of labs underestimated the activity.
Notes
These samples had rather low activity concentrations — around the detection limits 
required by the draft Commission directive. Apparently, the measurement of low levels 
of activity is troublesome for many laboratories.
Not all laboratories are routinely analysing water for these radionuclides yet. 
Accordingly, the unsatisfactory comparison results for radium-226 and radium-228 
were not so unexpected.
The comparison clearly demonstrates that a number of monitoring laboratories need 
to improve their analysis procedures for radium.
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The full report on this PT can be downloaded free of charge from: 
https://remon.jrc.ec.europa.eu/Services/Proficiency-Tests
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 Proficiency test IV
Soil (2010)
Measuring 15 radionuclides put the Member States’ labs to 
the test
Why was it performed?
Soil is one of the most complicated environmental matrices to measure due to 
its complex chemistry, inhomogeneous nature and as it naturally contains many 
radionuclides. It is also one of the most important matrices to measure for obvious 
reasons, particularly following a nuclear accident. Until this exercise was carried out 
there had never been a soil material in the PTs in support of Article 35.
This PT put the Member States’ labs to the test on how to measure a wide range of 
radionuclides in soil — no fewer than 15 different ones. Here, a certified reference 
material produced by the IAEA (No 375, Soil) was used as a base material for the 
comparison samples. This was of course not known to the participants.
Radionuclides, radiation and measurement techniques
40K, 90Sr, 137Cs, 212Pb, 212Bi, 214Pb, 214Bi, 226Ra, 230Th, 232Th, 234U, 235U, 238U, 238Pu and 239+240Pu.
To measure all of these radionuclides the Member States’ laboratories needed the 
capacity for both GS and AS, combined with radiochemical work.
Key findings
Of 73 reporting laboratories only nine determined the activity concentrations of all 
radionuclides. In total, 743 results were reported, including some values below the 
detection limit.
Potassium-40 and caesium-137 are the radionuclides most often determined in 
environmental samples such as soil or sediments. The determination of these 
radionuclides was the least problematic for the PT participants as it is done using GS, 
which does not require radiochemistry.
The determination of strontium-90, which is also frequently determined in 
environmental samples, caused difficulties for the majority of the laboratories as it 
requires radiochemistry. In more than 65 % of cases the reported results deviated 
more than 20 % from the reference value. Accordingly, the laboratories with poor 
results were urged to review their analytical procedures.
19
Figure 5. Soil is a difficult matrix to dissolve, and consequently the strontium-90 
results were not as good as, for example, those in the 2005 PT on milk powder.
Notes
The results for the determination of uranium isotopes also clearly demonstrated 
that several laboratories needed to improve their analytical procedures. The results 
for uranium-235 were found to be highly method dependent. GS rendered very poor 
results in comparison to AS. This is most probably due to the lack of application of 
appropriate interference corrections in these measurements.
A similar situation of unsatisfactory scores for GS results was observed for radium-226, 
and this was probably for reasons similar to those in the case of uranium-235.
One conclusion is that since no radiochemistry is needed for GS it is also used for 
analysing radionuclides where other methods (that do require radiochemistry) give 
better results.
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The full report on this PT can be downloaded free of charge from: 
https://remon.jrc.ec.europa.eu/Services/Proficiency-Tests
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Proficiency test V
Dried bilberries (2011)
A reference material that is representative of a whole range 
of food products
Why was it performed?
Bilberries (European blueberries, genus Vaccinium) are a suitable matrix that can 
represent a great number of other berries and fruit. Contaminated bilberries were 
collected in the region affected by the Chernobyl accident, then homogenised and 
bottled at JRC-Geel. The reference values traceable to SI units were established in a 
comparison in which nine expert laboratories from national metrology institutes and 
the IAEA participated.
Radionuclides, radiation and measurement techniques
Caesium-137, potassium-40, strontium-90 (see PT II).
Key findings
The comparison demonstrates that several laboratories had difficulties in determining 
activity concentrations of caesium-137 and potassium-40 in food samples: in 9 % and 
17 % of the labs respectively, results deviated more than 20 % from the reference 
values.
For strontium-90, 23 % of the labs were outside the 20 % criterion. The improved 
performance in comparison with the previous PTs can be attributed to the fact that 
it is easier to chemically separate strontium from a dried-fruit matrix than from milk 
powder or soil.
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Figure 6. Strontium-90 is important from a radioprotection point of view as it is a 
‘bone seeker’. The results are quite good, and much better than for the previous PT 
on soil.
Notes
The results for strontium-90 are better than for the previous PT on soil. This is an 
indication that it is easier to perform chemical separation in plant material than in soil.
Forty-nine out of 88 participating labs submitted results for all three radionuclides.
Four labs only submitted results for one radionuclide.
Fifty-one labs submitted results for strontium-90.
Eighty-four labs submitted results for potassium-40.
Eighty-six labs submitted results for caesium-137.
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The full report on this PT can be downloaded free of charge from: 
https://remon.jrc.ec.europa.eu/Services/Proficiency-Tests
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Proficiency test VI
Mineral water (2012)
Highlighting the diversity of lab practices and a controversial 
analytical method: gross counting
Why was it performed?
This PT was conducted by 71 participating labs in anticipation and support of the new 
Euratom drinking water directive (Council Directive 2013/51/Euratom), which includes 
gross alpha and beta activity screening levels.
Radionuclides, radiation and measurement techniques
No specific radionuclides were measured in this PT. Instead, gross counting methods 
were used where the gross alpha or beta activity is measured. Three different water 
reference materials were provided to each lab. Each lab could thus report six values.
Key findings
Only one laboratory was able to determine gross alpha/beta activities within the 
reference range (± 30 % from the reference values) for all three waters. Furthermore, 
only 42 % of the participants could report at least half of the six results within the 
reference range.
In total more than half of the laboratories had severe problems. For example eight 
laboratories (11 %) were not able to report any measurement data within the reference 
range at all.
None of the gross counting methods used by participants proved to be superior to 
the others. Even the application of the same method in different laboratories did not 
guarantee comparable results.
Gross counting methods can be treacherous, as different radionuclides give different 
responses in the detectors used. The detector response can be highly unpredictable if 
a sample contains radionuclides that are different from those used when calibrating 
an instrument.
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Figure 7. A typical graph showing the results from gross counting methods on 
mineral water. The spread of results is very wide, which shows that there is not 
sufficient metrological control in the majority of labs.
Notes
Some of the reasons for the unsatisfactory results were as follows.
  The initial radionuclide composition of the samples was not known beforehand, and 
the gross counting technique is sensitive to changes in the radionuclide composition 
compared to the calibration samples.
  One of the samples had a very low gross alpha activity concentration.
  Sample preparation methods (possible loss of volatile radionuclides).
  The time delay between sample preparation and measurement (ingrowth of radon and 
its progenies).
  Method-specific pitfalls: since 40K is not co-precipitated it is excluded from the gross beta 
results, whereas if direct evaporation or LSC is used then 40K contributes to the gross 
beta activity.
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The full report on this PT can be downloaded free of charge from: 
https://remon.jrc.ec.europa.eu/Services/Proficiency-Tests
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 Proficiency test VII
Air filter (2014)
The 2003 exercise repeated — with more labs and similar results
Why was it performed?
This exercise was in principle identical to the exercise in 2003 and could therefore be 
used as a good benchmark on possible improvements in laboratories’ measurement 
results. Just like in 2003, the participants sent their own filters to JRC-Geel where 
they were spiked with caesium-137. Of 76 participating laboratories in 2014, 30 had 
participated in the 2003 exercise.
Monitoring radioactivity in air is of paramount importance. There are about 5 000 
stations in Europe for monitoring dose rates (with no information on the radionuclide), 
but ‘only’ around 250 stations for sampling particulates in air on filters, from which 
quantitative radionuclide information can be obtained.
Radionuclides, radiation and measurement techniques
See PT I.
Key findings
Only five laboratories reported results that deviated more than ± 33 % from the 
reference value. A small improvement of acceptable relative deviation (from 87 % to 
93 % of the labs) was seen compared to the PT in 2003.
When including the uncertainty estimation in the evaluation, 23 laboratories reported 
results that were not compliant.
The types and sizes of filters used in Member States’ labs are highly diverse. For this PT 
they ranged in size from 17 cm2 to 4 200 cm2. The most common types are made of 
either nitrocellulose, polypropylene or glass fibres. No correlation was found between 
the filter used and the relative deviation. However, the labs with large filters obtained 
higher En numbers (underestimation of uncertainty).
There is no harmonised best practice. The amount of air that is sampled varies greatly, 
as do the sampling intervals (daily, weekly, monthly, annually or ad hoc).
Of the 30 laboratories that participated in 2003, nine improved their results. However, 
seven labs that reported acceptable results in 2003 are now non-compliant (with 
regard to either En number or relative deviation).
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Figure 8. Air filters constitute a very simple matrix and this result from caesium-137 
confirms the good standard of the vast majority of the labs.
Notes
The 33 % range (also used in the 2003 exercise) was chosen, taking into account the 
low caesium-137 activity level and the non-homogeneous distribution of the activity 
on the air filters. The activity on each filter varied — as a consequence of the different 
types of filters the participants use — from 70 mBq to 2.3 Bq (a factor of 32).
Only one lab used a NaI detector (with poor resolution) and the remaining 75 labs used 
an HPGe detector (with high resolution).
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The full report on this PT can be downloaded free of charge from: 
https://remon.jrc.ec.europa.eu/Services/Proficiency-Tests
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Proficiency test VIII
Air filter (2016)
Highlighting problems with Cs-134 and I-131
Why was it performed?
Formally, this exercise was conducted as part of a European metrological research project 
funded by Euramet. For this reason, the identity of each lab was not revealed to either 
the Commission’s Directorate-General for Energy or to the national regulatory authority. 
However, the PT was similar to the exercises conducted in 2003 and 2014, with the 
difference that caesium-134 and iodine-131 were also included. Out of the 67 participants, 
57 (85 %) also participated in 2014. In total, 26 laboratories participated in all three air-
filter PTs.
Radionuclides, radiation and measurement techniques
Caesium-137 (see PT 1).
Caesium-134 (beta decaying but also emitting gamma rays; half-life 2 years).
Iodine-131 (beta decaying but also emitting gamma rays; half-life 8 days).
All three radionuclides are very important to monitor following a nuclear accident using GS.
The results were such that 56 out of the 67 participating laboratories (84 %) reported 
values within the ± 20 % range of the reference value for both caesium-137 and 
caesium-134, but for iodine-131 it was only 20 (30 %) laboratories. The reasons for the 
reported results generally being too low for iodine-131 are as follows.
  The filters from different countries are made from different materials. Some materials 
are better than others in retaining the iodine.
  Some laboratories use other types of filters for measuring iodine in air than those 
used in this PT (e.g. using trapping in activated carbon).
  Although all participants were instructed to keep the filter inside the plastic bags 
in which they were delivered, some laboratories took out the filter before the 
measurements, which caused a loss of iodine.
  Some laboratories admitted to drying the filter (as instructed in their own written 
procedures), which of course led to a loss of iodine.
  Failing to perform a correction for decay during measurement or a normal decay correction 
can result in too low a result for iodine-131, which has a short half-life (8 days).
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Key findings
For caesium-134 many laboratories reported too low a value. The key reason for this is a 
failure to perform a coincidence-summing correction.
When comparing caesium-137 with the PTs in 2003 and 2014, one can observe a slight 
improvement over the years.
The PT highlights the need of further study to better understand the discrepancies for 
iodine-131.
 
Figure 9. Results from caesium-134 measurements often show a slight negative 
bias, which is also the case here.
Notes
Iodine-131 has a short half-life (8 days) and is therefore of great concern during 
the first weeks following a nuclear accident, particularly as it induces thyroid cancer, 
predominantly amongst children. Iodine is also a volatile element that is easily lost 
from a sample, and is therefore of concern as the level can easily be underestimated.
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The full report on this PT can be downloaded free of charge from: 
https://remon.jrc.ec.europa.eu/Services/Proficiency-Tests
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Proficiency test IX
Dried maize (2017)
Emergency reporting introduced for the first time
Why was it performed?
The aims of this PT were:
  to verify the performance of Member States’ labs on a feed matrix (maize) and the 
three most important radionuclides following a nuclear accident;
  to verify the performance of the Member States’ labs in performing rapid 
measurements and reporting as requested in case of a real accident scenario.
This was the first time in the JRC’s PT scheme for radioactivity that emergency 
reporting was introduced. The labs were asked on a voluntary basis to submit their 
results within 48 hours from the receipt of the sample. For the ‘normal’ compulsory 
(routine) reporting the labs had about 2 months.
Radionuclides, radiation and measurement techniques
Caesium-134, caesium-137, iodine-131 (see PT VIII). All three radionuclides are easy 
to measure using GS with an HPGe detector.
The maize powder was produced from commercially available maize grains intended 
for usage as feed. The production went through the following steps: cryomilling, 
sieving, milling, sieving, mixing, spiking with radioactivity, mixing, milling, mixing and, 
finally, bottling.
Key findings
There were 120 laboratories that submitted results within the 2-month deadline.
Seventy laboratories (more than half of the total number of participants) submitted 
results for the (voluntary) emergency reporting.
The overall results were better for the emergency reporting than for the routine 
reporting, indicating that the laboratories that participated in the emergency exercise 
are probably the more experienced/competent ones.
The results for caesium-137 and iodine-131 showed no particular bias, i.e. about the 
same number of labs measured values that are slightly too low as measured values 
that are slightly too high.
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As in all previous PTs there were many labs that measured values for caesium-134 
that were slightly too low. This was most likely due to not performing coincidence-
summing correction, which is important for caesium-134.
Except for a few outliers, the general measurement precision was good for all three 
radionuclides.
 
Figure 10. As usual, many labs measure caesium-134 values that are slightly too 
low (due to coincidence summing), but most labs do a good job.
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The full report on this PT can be downloaded free of charge from: 
https://remon.jrc.ec.europa.eu/Services/Proficiency-Tests
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Proficiency test X
Drinking water (2018)
Observation: loss of the inert gas radon causes 
underestimation of activity
Why was it performed?
Radon is a naturally occurring radioactive gas that is very bad to inhale due to the 
alpha particles that it emits. It has also many radioactive progenies, and in fact 1 Bq 
of radon-222 will result in 8 Bq of total activity if the progenies are contained. Due to 
the associated health hazards radon is heavily regulated. In 2013 the Council issued 
a new directive, the Euratom drinking water directive. This PT was organised as a 
response to requests from Member States’ experts and DG Energy to verify drinking-
water controls.
In addition, due to the short half-life (3.8 days) and problems of sampling and storage 
there have been very few intercomparisons or PTs in the past. There is therefore a need 
for harmonisation activities when it comes to radon-222.
Radionuclides, radiation and measurement techniques
Radon-222 (alpha decaying; half-life 3.8 days).
Three methods were used by the participants: (i) GS of the radon progenies, (ii) LSC 
and (iii) emanometry.
Key findings
We found that there were numerous sources (see notes on the following page) leading 
to radon loss that would generate a measurement result that is too low (see graph) — 
something that is problematic from a radioprotection perspective.
The measurement methods used all seem to be fit for purpose, and it cannot be 
concluded that one method did better compared to another.
However, the reproducibility of standardised techniques was much better than that 
from non-standardised techniques.
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Figure 11. The results with a slight negative bias indicating loss of radon.
Notes
The Euratom drinking water directive is formally called Council Directive 2013/51/Euratom 
of 22 October 2013 laying down requirements for the protection of the health of the 
general public with regard to radioactive substances in water intended for human 
consumption.
Radon-222 is an inert gas (does not react chemically) and can therefore easily escape 
from the sample and measurement volume, making all methods inherently less robust 
if care is not taken during sampling, transport and storage.
Based on feedback from Member States’ labs and experts we are seeking to organise a 
PT involving sampling and transport in the future (as this has never been done before). 
Radon in drinking water would be the obvious choice for such a PT.
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The full report on this PT can be downloaded free of charge from: 
https://remon.jrc.ec.europa.eu/Services/Proficiency-Tests
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Future directions
Consequences of measurement errors
Measurements by monitoring laboratories impact both financial and health aspects of 
society. Reporting numbers that are too high may lead to unnecessary remedial and legal 
actions and a difficult process to remove products from the market. In addition, it may 
cause stress for people who think they may have been exposed to dangerous levels of 
radiation. Experiences from Chernobyl and Fukushima show that the latter point needs to 
be taken very seriously.
Reporting values that are too low may cause: (i) long-term health effects in workers and 
the general public due to the failure to detect a radiation hazard; (ii) a failure to properly 
trace back the source of an undisclosed release of radioactivity; (iii) possible overestimation 
of the impact of future releases due to having values at present that are too low.
If Chernobyl happened today
In comparison to 1986 the monitoring labs in the EU are now much better prepared 
to handle a situation like Chernobyl. Measurement equipment has improved and the 
awareness of what samples to measure and which radionuclides to look for is greater. 
Many labs also conduct regular emergency exercises.
There are, however, some things to consider. During emergency situations other methods 
are used compared to routine monitoring. In addition, staff may have to cope with 
contaminated labs and stress. In the future Member States may have to look further into 
such aspects, which are more cumbersome to test.
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A list of future actions
Knowledge
The most important action is to make sure that there are sufficient people with the right 
education to operate the labs in the correct way. In particular there are concerns regarding 
the number of radiochemists being trained in Europe today.
Underperforming labs
In every PT there are a few labs that underperform and report data far from the reference 
values. It is important that Member States take action to help these labs improve. In some 
cases such issues may be due to an occasional error, but in many cases they are more 
structural in nature. Again, training and PT participation offer important pieces of the cure.
Sampling and measurements
The results reported in our PTs can be considered a best-case scenario, where the labs 
measure a well-characterised matrix. In a real-world scenario they will most likely face 
challenges during sampling and transport. Work is needed in the future on how to ensure 
representative samples, and for example how to handle the volatility of substances such 
as iodine or inert radon.
In some cases the measurement methodology needs to be developed. Some methods, 
such as gross counting methods, should be used with great caution, or even phased out 
altogether, highlighting the need to replace the method of choice at the laboratory with 
more robust methods.
Reference labs
The Fukushima accident demonstrated the important role of reference labs and how they 
could help less-experienced labs improve. The staff in such labs should also lead work 
on international (written) standards — work that is crucial for monitoring activities, but 
difficult as it requires funding from the ‘home institute’ (and not from the standardisation 
body). Furthermore, the development of reference materials is essential: the present stock 
of reference materials is decaying, and new materials and radionuclides need to be added.
Neighbouring countries
From an EU perspective, it is reassuring when fellow Member States cooperate to implement 
a solid monitoring capacity across Europe. Not only does this help the EU broadcast an 
early warning, but it also guarantees that a minimal amount of radioactive products will 
spread from a contaminated region.
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Science
Finally, we can also see that monitoring labs can contribute to scientific studies. By 
establishing baseline radioactivity levels (i.e. the present level of radioactivity in the 
environment), it becomes easier to assess the impact of future anthropogenic activities. 
Radioecological data are also needed to establish the uptake of various radionuclides in 
different organisms and the impact of different soil conditions. Such research will help to 
assess the safety of agriculture on slightly contaminated land with an eye to establishing 
whether the final product is good for consumption.
 
ANNEX
Introduction to radioactivity  
measurement and the activities  
at JRC-GEEL — A brief tutorial
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Measuring radioactivity
Normally, three types of radiation are measured
Radioactivity is the process by which the nucleus of an unstable atom changes, and 
emits ionising radiation. The most well-known types of ionising radiation can be seen 
in the table below.
Table A1. Brief description of three types of ionising radiation.
In total there are around 3 500 radionuclides
On earth around 95 naturally occurring elements are present. They can exist in 
thousands of different varieties depending on the configuration of their nucleus. About 
3 500 of these varieties have been identified as being radioactive; these are what are 
referred to as radionuclides. They disintegrate while emitting radiation — some very 
quickly, some very slowly.
For direct societal needs it is important to monitor or study around 200 radionuclides 
on a regular basis. This includes both naturally occurring radionuclides and man-made 
radionuclides used in medicine and industry. However, all 3 500 are interesting for science.
The becquerel unit
The activity of a radioactive material is measured using the becquerel (Bq) SI unit. This 
unit represents the number of atoms that decay (disintegrate) in 1 second. The BIPM, 
which is located in Paris, is in charge of defining and realising all SI units, including 
the Bq.
Type of radiation Description of the radiation Penetrative power
Alpha particles Helium-4 nucleus  (2 protons + 2 neutrons)
Stopped by paper; cannot 
penetrate skin
Beta particles Electrons Stopped by a sheet of metal
Gamma rays Electromagnetic radiation Attenuated by heavy elements such as lead
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The half-life indicates the rate of decay
The half-life is a concept that is used to describe how quickly a radionuclide decays. It 
is defined as the time required for 50 % of the atoms to disintegrate. A substance with 
a short half-life will thus quickly become harmless to humans. For example iodine-131 
loses half of its activity in 8 days.
Table A2. ‘The usual suspects’ — a few examples of radionuclides that are important to 
monitor.
Radionuclide Half-life Decay mode Typical source
Potassium-40 1.3 billion years Beta decay (*) Natural
Caesium-134 2 years Beta decay (*) Nuclear accident
Caesium-137 30 years Beta decay (*) Nuclear accident
Strontium-90 29 years Beta decay (*) Nuclear accident
Iodine-131 8 days Beta decay (*) Nuclear accident, release from hospitals, etc.
Radium-226 1 600 years Alpha decay (*) Natural
Radium-228 6 years Beta decay (*) Natural
Thorium-232 14 billion years Alpha decay Natural
Radon-222 3.8 days Alpha decay Natural
Uranium-238 4.5 billion years Alpha decay Natural (also in nuclear fuel)
Hydrogen-3; 
Tritium
12 years Beta decay Release from nuclear 
facility
(*) Accompanied by a subsequent strong gamma-ray emission.
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Why we measure 
radioactivity
Radiation is naturally present everywhere
Radioactivity is a naturally occurring phenomenon. Here on earth it can be detected 
everywhere: in water, soil, rock, living organisms such as plants and animals, 
construction materials, etc. There is, for example, around 100 Bq/kg naturally present 
in the human body (mainly potassium-40 and carbon-14, the latter commonly used 
for the age estimation of ancient organic material).
Ionising radiation can be harmful in two ways
Although ionising radiation damages DNA and cells, it is not dangerous at the ‘normal’ 
levels present in and around us as the body’s natural repair mechanisms are tailored 
to handling this. At increased levels, however, ionising radiation is dangerous. The 
harmful effects are often divided in two categories.
  Deterministic effects. Direct damage to tissues as a result of the death or 
malfunction of cells. This includes acute radiation sickness and burns that appear 
shortly after irradiation.
  Stochastic effects. Damage to DNA, leading to random mutations that may or 
may not prove harmful over a longer course of time, in some cases causing cancer 
or hereditary defects.
Inside/outside the body
Different radionuclides affect the body differently depending on the radiation they emit 
and which organ is being targeted.
Alpha emitters deposit a large amount of energy within a short range and are 
therefore more dangerous when they are inside the body than outside. An example is 
the radioactive noble gas radon, which together with its decay products causes great 
damage to the lungs when inhaled.
Beta emitters can also cause problems inside the body. An example is iodine-131, 
which accumulates in the thyroid gland and may cause local damage.
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To describe the rate at which different radionuclides enter and leave the body the term 
biological half-life is often used. Caesium-137, for example, is removed from the body 
relatively fast. Its biological half-life is about 70 days, although its physical half-life is 
30 years. In contrast some radionuclides are said to be ‘bone seekers’, and stay in the 
skeleton for a very long time. An example of this is strontium-90, for which the (highly 
uncertain) biological half-life is between 18 years and 50 years.
Harmful radiation can come from different sources
Increased levels come mostly from the following sources.
  Major nuclear accidents. For example the wind-borne particles from the Chernobyl 
accident in 1986.
  Accidental releases from nuclear installations. Several leaks of gaseous 
iodine-131 from facilities producing or using medical radioisotopes have been 
reported.
  Hospitals and industry. For example obsolete industrial or medical equipment 
containing cobalt-60.
  Natural sources. For example radon-222 from the decay of radium and uranium in 
the ground and in building materials.
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Case studies
(1) https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_civilian_radiation_accidents 
(2)  https://web.archive.org/web/20170503063725/http://www-pub.iaea.org/books/IAEABooks/Publications_on_
Accident_Response; https://www-news.iaea.org/EventList.aspx?ps=100
Below are some cases that illustrate the ever-present need for radioactivity 
monitoring. More case studies can be found on Wikipedia (1) or on the IAEA 
website (2).
Chernobyl 1986
The most well-known nuclear accident took place in the Soviet Union on 25 and 26 April 
1986. A nuclear plant close to the town Pripyat (in present-day Ukraine) suffered an 
explosion in one of its reactors. Consequently, radioactive material was spread all over 
Europe on easterly winds. Although there was no official reporting about the accident, 
radioactive contamination was monitored by a number of European states. The first 
observations were made on 28 April at Forsmark nuclear power plant on the east coast 
of Sweden, where the staff were found to have radioactive particles on their workwear.
Radioactive metal being handled as scrap
Sometimes batches of radioactive metals go astray, typically when radiation equipment 
is scrapped in countries with a poor monitoring structure. A common example is 
cobalt-60, which is widely used for medical applications, not least during external 
beam radiotherapy for cancer.
Radioactive metals may look to the eye like any harmless scrap metal. Over the years 
this has led to a number of accidents in different places. In some extreme cases 
radioactive scrap metal has even been melted and recycled. As late as 2013 the metal 
studs of a leather belt sold by an online retailer tested positive for cobalt-60; this was 
monitored by US border control and led to a worldwide recall of the product.
Another illustrative incident took place in Mexico in 2013. Robbers stole a lorry carrying 
cobalt-60 from obsolete radiation therapy equipment that was on its way to a waste 
facility. One of the robbers was subjected to radiation as he removed the material 
from its protective casing and spilled the cobalt-60 pellets on the ground.
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Fukushima 2011
(3)  https://www.irsn.fr/EN/newsroom/News/Documents/IRSN_Information-Report_Ruthenium-106-in-europe 
_20171109.pdf 
https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1907571116
On 11 March 2011 an earthquake of moment magnitude 9.1 off the east coast of 
Japan caused a gigantic tsunami. It destroyed a number of villages along the coast 
and killed almost 20 000 people.
The nuclear power plant at Fukushima was also hit but at first seemed to suffer no 
serious damage as the shutdown worked well. Unfortunately, the reserve generators 
responsible for driving the cooling of the very hot reactor fuel were damaged. This led 
to the overheating of the fuel and subsequent chemical explosions in which radioactivity 
was released into the air and sea. Japan quickly realised that their monitoring capacity 
was not sufficient to guarantee the safe use of food products. Many new laboratories 
were therefore quickly set up with the task of checking food (and other) products. To 
guarantee the quality of the results from these new laboratories several Japanese 
expert labs produced new reference materials (rice, fish, etc.) for these labs and started 
organising PTs. Studies have shown that when the public has the possibility to have their 
own home-grown food products checked for radioactivity, the psychological effect is very 
positive and greatly influences the general well-being of the public.
Undisclosed accidents
With the improvement of monitoring networks it is more difficult for operators to get 
away with undisclosed events. Below is a recent example.
In early October 2017 many European labs started detecting ruthenium-106 in filters 
they used for monitoring radioactivity in air. This is an unusual radionuclide to detect in air, 
particularly when it is detected by itself and is not accompanied by other radionuclides. 
The activities were very low and posed no danger to human health in the areas in the 
EU where it was detected. Still, it was a mystery that it had showed up. Ruthenium-106 
is used for the treatment of cancer of the eye, but it was unlikely that the release could 
come from such production.
By collating data from European laboratories and comparing them with meteorological data 
it was possible for researchers to claim with high probability that the release came from 
a specific region and was probably in the order of more than 100 TBq (100 trillion Bq) (3).
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Activities at JRC-Geel
The Member States of the European Union continuously 
monitor radioactivity in the environment
Chapter 3 of the Euratom Treaty (Articles 30-39) specifies what actions the EU Member 
States must take to guarantee public safety. Accordingly, Article 35 obliges the EU 
Member States to monitor radioactivity in the environment. This work involves the 
following two responsibilities.
  The regular sampling and measurement of various specimens (air, water, soil, food 
feed, etc.) to confirm that there are no alarming deviations from base values.
  The preparedness for emergency scenarios when it may be necessary to process 
vast numbers of samples within a short period of time.
 The JRC makes sure these monitoring data are accurate and 
available
 The Euratom Treaty also obliges the Commission to verify that these operations are 
performed up to standard (Articles 35 and 36). Furthermore, it states that the JRC shall 
assist the Commission in these tasks (Article 39). The following JRC services carry out 
these assignments:
  JRC-Geel (northern Belgium; called IRMM until 2016) verifies the quality of the 
monitoring results by organising PTs.
  JRC-Ispra (northern Italy) collects and publishes the monitoring data that the Member 
States’ laboratories report.
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JRC-Geel represents a stamp of quality
The laboratories at JRC-Geel bring together some of Europe’s leading experts and 
represent the most advanced instrument park for radioactivity measurement. As they 
specialise in developing and performing highly accurate measurements and preparing 
reference materials, their activities can be seen as a benchmark and a stamp of quality.
JRC-Geel gives valuable feedback to the labs of the Member States and contributes to 
ensuring the following.
  No costly or harmful decisions are taken from faulty data.
  EU citizens can trust the information and recommendations from their authorities.
In addition, JRC-Geel helps the EU and the Member States to trace sources of unreported 
radioactivity release.
The collated data also form a useful resource for scientists
Each year, more and more members of the scientific community realise that the freely 
obtainable data from the JRC and the Member States can be used in areas far beyond 
nuclear physics, for example:
  to understand the climate and the environment;
  to validate computer models that predict, for example, atmospheric dispersion.
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JRC-Geel’s core competence: 
proficiency tests
Proficiency tests confirm the skill of Member States’ 
monitoring labs
Quis custodiet ipsos custodes? — ‘Who watches the watchmen?’ This classic Latin 
phrase points out why PTs are needed and performed.
In a PT the organiser distributes the same reference material to all participating labs. The 
labs measure what is asked (in this case the unknown activity of specific radionuclides) 
and report back to the organiser. The organiser summarises the results and informs the 
laboratories of whether they passed or failed (or provided questionable results).
All results are publicly available, but it is not revealed which result belongs to which 
laboratory. However, for each Member State, the national regulatory authority receives 
detailed information on how that country’s labs are performing.
The PTs are requested by DG Energy based on input from the 
Member States
The PTs are initiated by the Commission’s DG Energy. DG Energy organises meetings on 
a regular basis with Member States’ experts, at which issues connected to Articles 35 
and 36 of the Euratom Treaty are discussed. During these gatherings the participating 
experts (representing the EU Member States) can express their wishes for matrices and 
radionuclides they consider to be of particular importance. After feedback from JRC-
Geel a decision is normally taken at the next meeting.
Producing a reference material requires special skills
JRC-Geel specialises in producing large quantities of reference materials on an industrial 
scale in its reference material laboratory. It is essential that the reference material 
be of the highest quality (stable and homogeneous) and that the reference values be 
undisputed, robust and set before the exercise, just like the evaluation criteria. Producing 
a good-quality reference material of a ‘natural matrix’ can be a complex procedure, 
involving highly controlled sampling, cutting, crushing, mixing, sieving, etc.
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There are two categories of reference materials.
  Spiked materials, for which the radioactivity is added in the laboratory.
  Natural radioactive materials, for which the radioactivity is taken up by the organism 
(plant/animal) or incorporated into the matrix (soil, sediments).
Reference values are determined by spiking or reference 
measurements
Once the homogeneity of the samples is established, reference values are determined. 
This can be done in different ways, depending on the reference material and 
radionuclides.
  Spiking a standardised solution, i.e. adding a known amount of radioactivity to a 
water-based solution (e.g. mineral water).
  Spiking a solid material. Usually a slurry is spiked and then dried. This is a more 
complicated action that requires extensive experience and quality checks.
  Reference measurements of a sampled material (e.g. grass from the Chernobyl 
area). This is the alternative which is closest to a real-case scenario but difficult as 
no a priori knowledge of the activity is available. Therefore, reference measurements 
by the JRC and as well as trusted laboratories have to be made to establish the 
actual activity level.
Three main criteria are used: relative difference, z- and zeta 
score (previously also En number)
The PTs follow the recommendations of the ISO 17043 standard, which prescribes a 
number of different evaluation criteria. The two main evaluation criteria are as follows.
  Relative difference (between the reported value and the reference value). This 
is the most basic evaluation criteria. It is also the only one shown in graphs in this 
brief report.
  Z score. This score takes into account the difference between the reported value 
and the reference value and compares the difference to the standard deviation of 
the proficiency test.
  Zeta score. This is an important score as it takes into account not only the deviation 
in the result but also the reported uncertainty. Reporting a correct uncertainty is 
necessary to understand how much weight one can give to a certain measurement 
when taking a decision. (In earlier PTs the En number was used in a similar way, but 
it has now been replaced by the zeta score.)
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A number of detection techniques are used by the 
Member States
Measuring radioactive decay is both a science and art in itself. The table below 
summarises some of the most common methods used.
Table A3. Brief description of common radioactivity measurement techniques.
We distinguish between ‘counting’ and ‘spectrometry’.
  During counting one has to make sure that there is only one radionuclide in the 
sample and every count in the detector comes from that specific radionuclide.
  Spectrometry is useful when many radionuclides are present in the sample. Each 
radionuclide emits distinct gamma rays or alpha particles, which will give rise to 
peaks in a spectrum. The size of each peak is proportional to the amount (or activity) 
of that specific radionuclide.
 
Method Principle Used in PTs
Gamma-ray 
spectrometry (GS)
Direct measurement of gamma rays with 
an energy-sensitive radiation detector 
nowadays mostly made of high-purity 
germanium.
All except No. VI
Liquid scintillation 
counting (LSC)
The liquid sample is mixed into a cocktail of 
chemical substances that give away light 
when hit by ionising radiation. This light 
emission is measured.
II, III, V, VI, X
Alpha-particle 
spectrometry
Direct measurement of alpha particles. 
Nowadays mostly with a silicon 
semiconductor detector.
III, IV
Solid-state scintillation 
counting
Alpha particles produce light in the solid 
detector. The light is detected using 
photomultipliers.
II, VI, X
Gas-flow proportional 
counting
A detector filled with a gas (e.g. argon-methane 
gas mixture) inside which a high voltage is 
placed. Alpha and beta particles will induce 
electrical pulses when ionising the gas.
II, III, V, VI
Emanometry
A technique in which radioactive substances 
are degassed into air/gas followed by 
detection of radiation/particles present in the 
air/gas using different detection techniques 
(e.g. air ionisation, solid-state scintillators or 
semiconductors).
X
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List of initialisms
AS  alpha-particle spectrometry
BIPM  International Bureau of Weights and Measures
EU  European Union
GS  gamma-ray spectrometry
HPGe  high-purity germanium
IAEA  International Atomic Energy Agency
JRC  Joint Research Centre (of the European Commission)
LSC  liquid scintillation counting
PT  proficiency test
SI  International System of Units
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